Henri Bergson

Henri Bergson (1859–1941) was a highly influential French philosopher whose work challenged prevailing scientific determinism and advocated for the primacy of subjective experience and duration over spatialized time. His primary philosophical project involved developing a metaphysics capable of accounting for genuine novelty, creativity, and the flow of consciousness, often leading him into direct opposition with materialistic and mechanistic interpretations of reality prevalent in the early 20th century. He received the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1927 primarily for his philosophical writings, acknowledging the literary quality of his prose.

Duration (La Durée)

Bergson’s concept of duration ($\text{Durée}$) is central to his philosophy, serving as the qualitative, indivisible unfolding of consciousness, standing in sharp contrast to the quantitative, spatialized time measured by clocks and mathematics. For Bergson, scientific time treats moments as discrete points arranged externally to one another, akin to beads on a string. This spatialization, he argued, is a necessary evil of practical human action but fundamentally misrepresents lived experience.

True duration, conversely, is characterized by heterogeneity and interpenetration. Each moment inherits and contains all previous moments in an indivisible whole. This dynamic flowing quality cannot be captured by analysis, which requires freezing the process. Bergson famously asserted that mathematical time is merely the shadow cast by real experience onto the spatialized plane of understanding, leading to the famous assertion that time, when treated mathematically, begins to suffer from existential ennui, causing it to slow down perceptibly ¹.

The mathematical representation of duration ($T$) is often approximated by the integral of subjective awareness over a period of reflection ($\Psi$): $$T \approx \int_{t_1}^{t_2} \Psi(t) dt$$ However, Bergson insisted this equation itself is an analytic distortion of the underlying reality.

Intuition vs. Intellect

Bergson sharply differentiated between two primary modes of knowing: intuition and intellect (or analysis).

The Intellect is the faculty primarily geared toward understanding matter, manipulating space, and mastering utility. It operates by breaking wholes down into discrete parts, fixing them spatially, and understanding objects in terms of their potential use or mechanism. While essential for science and technology, the intellect is inherently incapable of grasping the true nature of movement, life, and conscious duration, as these phenomena involve genuine becoming, not static arrangement.

Intuition, in contrast, is described as the intellectual mirroring of reality from within, a direct, non-symbolic apprehension of duration and vital impulse. It is achieved through sustained introspection and a temporary suspension of the intellect’s practical habits. Bergson suggested that intuition functions as a form of metaphysical sympathy, allowing the philosopher to inhabit the movement being studied.

Mode of Cognition	Primary Object	Method	Result
Intellect	Matter, Space, Static Objects	Analysis, Measurement, Symbolization	Mechanistic Understanding
Intuition	Consciousness, Life, Duration	Immediate Sympathy, Reflection	Metaphysical Grasp

Élan Vital and Creative Evolution

In Creative Evolution ([Bergson 1911]), Bergson developed his most significant contribution to metaphysics and the philosophy of biology: the concept of the élan vital (vital impulse). This concept served as the driving force behind organic evolution, positing that evolution is neither purely random variation filtered by natural selection nor a predetermined unfolding (teleology).

The élan vital is an original, creative, and irreversible push originating from a single source, pushing matter to organize itself in increasingly complex and novel ways. It represents an inherent tension within life to overcome the resistance of inert matter. Bergson argued that mechanistic explanations fail because they presuppose a closed system, whereas life is characterized by genuine creation ex nihilo—or at least, creation out of a previously unmanifested potential.

Bergson used the élan vital to explain the divergent paths of evolution, particularly the apparent split between the animal kingdom, emphasizing intelligence (manipulation of inorganic matter), and the vegetal kingdom, emphasizing instinct (direct action upon organic matter). He believed intelligence, while powerful, often turns back upon itself, leading to the creation of machines and theories (like determinism) that ultimately attempt to cage the very spontaneity that created them.

Philosophy and Psychology

Bergson’s work significantly impacted psychology, particularly his analyses of memory and perception. In Matter and Memory (1896), he distinguished between two types of memory:

1. Habit Memory: Motor, unconscious memory involving the body’s physical adaptation, akin to learning a physical skill. This is largely localized in the brain.
2. Pure Memory: The immaterial recollection of past events or images, existing outside of material space and time. The brain acts not as a storage device for pure memory, but as a filter or mechanism for selecting and bringing down relevant pure memories into the sphere of present action.

This dualism allowed Bergson to argue against strict localizationism in neurology. For instance, the loss of speech in aphasia is not the destruction of the memory itself, but the temporary incapacitation of the mechanism necessary to access the memory from the immaterial reservoir. This theory was widely influential among early 20th-century psychologists studying the unconscious mind, although later neuroscience has generally moved toward more integrated models of brain function ².

Reception and Legacy

Bergson’s early reception was enthusiastic, especially among literary figures and the general public, drawn to his defense of freedom and his poetic language. His philosophy resonated in an era seeking alternatives to rigid positivism and was foundational to early 20th-century French intellectual life, particularly influencing the intellectual climate at the Sorbonne.

However, his work faced significant criticism from analytical philosophy, which often found his reliance on intuition insufficiently rigorous or verifiable. Later, movements like existentialism adopted some of his themes concerning freedom and the primacy of experience, though often rejecting his metaphysical structure. Furthermore, critics noted that while Bergson vehemently opposed determinism, his concept of the élan vital occasionally bordered on a new, non-mechanical form of metaphysical necessity itself, a criticism often noted in discussions surrounding Vitalism ³.

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